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GLOSSARY
adversary

any unauthorized entity that exists on the
network, capable of listening, capturing, or
modifying network traﬃc

authentication

the property of validating that an entity is
in fact who they say they are

broadcast message

in the HARMS system, a message that is
sent to every peer in a system actor’s peer list

conﬁdentiality

the property of preventing unauthorized
entities from viewing the contents of a message
in a meaningful way

ciphertext

text that has been transformed in such a
way that makes it diﬃcult to comprehend
the original message; see conﬁdentiality

critical infrastructure

“the assets, systems, and networks, whether
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States
that their incapacitation or destruction
would have a debilitating eﬀect on security,
national economic security, national public
health or safety, or any combination thereof”
(“What is critical infrastructure?”, 2013, p. 1)

emergent behavior

a property where simple systems join together
in a complex environment to exhibit more
complex behaviors (Russell & Norvig, 2009)

x
HARMS model

a layered model where humans, agents, robots,
machines, and sensors connect, communicate,
and interact in a decentralized ad-hoc
environment for task completion (Lewis et al.,
2013)

HARMS system

the software implementation of the HARMS
model

indistinguishability

in the HARMS model, a system actor is not
concerned with the physical makeup of an
actor it is communicating with, only in its
ability to solve a goal or execute a task
(Matson & Min, 2011)

integrity

the property of being trustworthy; for data,
this property is held if the data has not been
modiﬁed

man-in-the-middle attack

a network attack where the adversary exists
in the middle of two communicating parties and
can listen to, capture, or change the data in
some way

multicast message

in the HARMS system, a message that is
sent to a speciﬁed amount of peers in a system
actor’s peer list

plaintext

the original, unmodiﬁed contents of a message

replay attack

a network attack where the adversary can
capture a message and send it at an arbitrary
point in time to the original recipient

system actor

in the HARMS model, any human, agent, robot,
machine, or sensor member of the network

xi
unicast message

in the HARMS system, a message that is
sent to one peer in a system actor’s peer list

xii

ABSTRACT
DeWees, Maxwell D. M.S., Purdue University, May 2015. Securing Communication
Within the HARMS Model for Use with Fireﬁghting Robots. Major Professor:
Eric T. Matson.
Humans and robots must work together in increasingly complex networks to
achieve a common goal. In this research, ﬁreﬁghting robots are a part of a larger,
decentralized system of humans, agents, robots, machines, and sensors (HARMS).
Although communication in a HARMS model has been utilized in previous research,
this new study looks at the security considerations of the communications layer of
the HARMS model. A network attack known as a man-in-the-middle attack is
successfully demonstrated in this paper. Then, a secure communications protocol is
proposed to help provide conﬁdentiality and authentication of HARMS actors. This
research is applied to any system that utilizes a HARMS network, including
ﬁreﬁghting robots, to help ensure malicious entities cannot exploit communications
by system actors. Instead, system actors that conﬁrm their identity can
communicate securely in a decentralized way for indistinguishable task completion.
The results of this experiment are successful, indicating that secure communication
can prevent man-in-the-middle attacks with minor diﬀerences in operation.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Multiple humans, software agents, robots, machines, and sensors (HARMS)
can join together to create a network of users or system actors to work together
toward a common goal. In this HARMS model, emergent behavior is observed as
indistinguishable, meaning any actor who is capable of performing a certain task is
chosen to do so, regardless of other factors such as architecture or cognitive design.
In this scenario, communication between HARMS actors is essential to other modes
of operation and can be achieved in a number of ways. The collection and analysis
of data in a robotic network is typically shared with other actors, which could be
other robots, agents, or humans in the system. Before this project, there was no
mechanism for providing authentication to the network for authorized users or
protecting the data being transmitted. This opened up vulnerabilities in the
network for adversaries to communicate with HARMS actors in an unauthenticated
manner. Therefore, the major goal of this research was to provide authorized, secure
communication in a multiagent network while maintaining indistinguishability.
This research applied this goal toward ﬁreﬁghting robots participating in a
HARMS-model network. Fireﬁghting robots have already been successfully used to
help aid human ﬁrst responders. When a command is given to a ﬁreﬁghting robot,
either from one robot to another or from a human actor, this command must be
authenticated and sent to the correct robot at all times. Communications should
not be intercepted, altered, or replayed by adversaries in an emergency response
situation. Unique to this situation, however, was securing communication while
maintaining emergent behavior and allowing for an automated decision-making
process among one or more actors. This provides indistinguishable task completion,
a major goal of actors in any HARMS model network, and a behavior that is

2
especially important in critical infrastructure networks such as multiagent
ﬁreﬁghters.

1.1 Scope
In this project, a multiagent robotic network refers to a HARMS-model
network (Lewis, Matson, Wei, & Min, 2013), consisting of any number of humans,
agents, robots, machines, and sensors. Each component of a HARMS-model
network is referred to as a system actor. For this work, the network was composed
of one or more actors of similar or diﬀerent types with the ability to communicate
with each other. In other words, the actors were heterogeneous in that they do not
have to be of similar design, architecture, shape, or ability. At a minimum, each
actor needed to have some mechanism for communication with the other actors in
the network. Furthermore, the HARMS model provides a goal of
indistinguishability, where any actor who is capable of performing a certain task is
chosen to do so, regardless of the other factors previously mentioned.
Actors or users are said to be authorized if they have permission to be a
member of the network. This permission can be given explicitly by the owner of the
network or through authentication mechanisms, which will be discussed later. In
contrast, unauthorized or malicious actors do not have permission to be a part of
the network. Any communication by unauthorized actors is unwanted and is seen as
malicious behavior or an active attack.
Communication between actors can be performed in several diﬀerent ways,
including standard Internet protocols used between machines, robots, and agents, as
well as natural language (e.g., text or speech) used by humans. Within the scope of
this project, communication between agents, robots, and machines were attempted
to be secured. Speciﬁcally, exploitations known as man-in-the-middle attacks were
considered. As discussed in Chapter 2, a variant of the man-in-the-middle attack
called the MiG-in-the-middle (Anderson, 2008) was examined. In this attack, the
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concept of identiﬁcation, friend or foe (IFF) is crucial, where authorized actors are
correctly distinguished from unauthorized ones. A subset of the man-in-the-middle
attack, known as a replay attack, was also considered and is discussed in this
project. Other attacks were considered outside the scope of this project and left for
future research.
The development of security mechanisms for communication in a
HARMS-model network was applied to ﬁreﬁghting robots. This application
provided a real-world scenario where a HARMS-model network could be used.
Speciﬁcally, multiple human ﬁreﬁghters and multiple ﬁreﬁghting robots create a
network whose goal is to extinguish a ﬁre. These ﬁreﬁghters are considered the
authenticated users, because the humans need to communicate to the robots to
control them via wireless remote control. Fireﬁghting robots also have the ability to
communicate with one another.

1.2 Signiﬁcance
Although the HARMS model was developed in previous work, no mechanism
for securing the communication of system actors in a HARMS-model network
existed previously. Secure communication from certain attacks was novel in a
HARMS-model network, because it provided decentralized authentication and
conﬁdentiality while maintaining indistinguishability. This means that authorized
actors can communicate securely with other authorized actors, but the overall goal
is still performed without the direct request of a user of the network to a speciﬁc
actor. An authorized system actor does not need to perform special (or
inconvenient) steps to communicate securely, but adversaries are unable to
understand the communications or participate without authorization.
Additionally, applying security of communications to a ﬁreﬁghting robot is
important because adversaries could cause signiﬁcant damage, including loss of life,
if they are able to successfully tamper with or disrupt communications to the robots
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during a ﬁreﬁght. The attack vector looked at speciﬁcally in this research,
generalized as a “man-in-the-middle” attack, is commonly seen in many
applications, including banking, e-commerce, and military environments (Anderson,
2008). Therefore, it is inevitable that adversaries will attempt this well-known
attack to leverage ﬁreﬁghting robots should they be relied on as the primary
mechanism for ﬁreﬁghting. This research could also be applied to other disaster
recovery or emergency response scenarios where using robots or HARMS-model
networks are also appropriate.

1.3 Research Question
In a multiagent robotic network, can communication between authorized
users be secured from unauthorized or malicious users?

1.4 Assumptions
The assumptions for this study included:
• Authenticated system actors were known at all times.
• Other wireless communication technology were not interfering or transmitting
during the experiment unless part of the designed attack.

1.5 Limitations
The limitations for this study included:
• Only man-in-the-middle (or middleperson) attacks and replay attacks were
considered.
• The solution is generalizable to all HARMS systems using for unicast,
multicast, and broadcast messages.
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• Implementation of secure communications might aﬀect the speed of
communication or the work required to authenticate users.

1.6 Delimitations
The delimitations for this study included:
• Other types of network attacks (including but not limited to
brute-force/exhaustive key search to break encryption, denial of service, or
other side-channel attacks) were not considered.
• Physical attacks such as tampering with or removing the robot or social
engineering were not considered.
• For safety reasons, experimentation did not occur during an actual ﬁre.
• Moral, ethical, or philosophical questions regarding the use of ﬁreﬁghting
robots were not considered.

1.7 Summary
As robotics begin to integrate into service tasks such as ﬁreﬁghting, it is
becoming increasingly more important for minimum security assurance levels to be
present. As with any technology used in critical infrastructure, health, or public
safety, potential cyberphysical vulnerabilities need to be identiﬁed and mitigated
before they are used to cause damage or in other malicious ways. This chapter
provided the signiﬁcance of this research project, which allows the scope to be
drawn around ﬁreﬁghting robots in a HARMS network. Although many attacks are
potentially feasible, the focus for this project was to secure communication against
man-in-the-middle and replay attacks. Assumptions, limitations, and delimitations
were provided to help describe boundaries and other issues that were expected to be
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encountered. The next chapter provides a review of the background literature
relevant to this project.

7

CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
This chapter provides a review of the background literature relevant to the
advancement of robotics with ﬁreﬁghting capabilities, both as individual robots and
working together in multiagent robotic networks. This research looks at the domain
of ﬁreﬁghting robots as it relates to a conceptual model for humans, agents, and
robots to work together. This model provides a compelling platform for multiple
ﬁreﬁghting robots of potentially diﬀerent designs to cooperate to accomplish a
common goal of extinguishing ﬁres and eliminating ﬁre threats to both victims as
well as human ﬁrst responders.
However, communication between humans and robots, as well as
communication between robots themselves, needs to be secured so that
unauthorized users or adversaries cannot inﬂict damage to the robots directly or use
them maliciously. Fireﬁghting in general is a subset of critical infrastructure, or
services and capabilities that are core to a country, and securing critical
infrastructure against cyberphysical attacks is a signiﬁcant but complicated issue.
Therefore, this chapter will also provide a discussion of security in robotics and
critical infrastructure, primarily from a viewpoint within the United States.
This chapter will provide a basis for the questions identiﬁed in the ﬁrst
chapter and explore how this project can attempt to solve this problem. This
chapter will be split into three major sections: background on ﬁreﬁghting robotics,
information on the network attacks considered for this research, and an overall view
of security and policy in the United States. This chapter will also serve as a starting
point for highlighting previous, related research and provide a history and
background information relevant to the project.
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2.1 Introduction to the HARMS model
Research and development in robotics have increased the capabilities of
robots and software agents rapidly. Humans are beginning to rely more and more on
the use of robots for task completion of many kinds, including in the workplace, as
municipal and private services, and even at home. The HARMS model (Matson &
Min, 2011) was developed to help create a system to bring robots and machines
together with humans so that they can cooperate or perform as a single entity or
collective organization. The HARMS model provides mobility, self-organization,
scalability, adaptability, and indistinguishability to a decentralized network of
(H)umans, (A)gents, (R)obots, (M)achines, and (S)ensors. Any one of these
members of a HARMS-model network is referred to as a system actor. Furthermore,
a beneﬁt of using the HARMS model is that it provides ﬂexibility among
conﬁguration of system actors. A network could be composed of many of one type
of system actor, or several diﬀerent system actors working together. These
combinations will be of use to ﬁreﬁghting robots and will be discussed in detail later
in this chapter.
The HARMS model is layered such that each layer includes and transcends
the previous one (Lewis, Matson, Wei, & Min, 2013). These layers start with
Network, the most fundamental layer and build up to Collective Intelligence, where
the model strives to provide emergent behavior via a collection of one or more
agents, robots, and humans (see Figure 2.1 for more details). Through this model,
the goal of indistinguishability is enabled, where any actor who is capable of
performing a task is chosen to do so without preference on which system actor
actually performs the task and regardless of build, architecture, or behavior. This
model is decentralized in that each system actor communicates directly with one or
more other actors directly, rather than communicating through a ﬁxed point. A
HARMS-model network provides the ability to send messages to multiple system
actors at once (known as multicast) or to the entire system (known as broadcast).
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Figure 2.1.: The HARMS layered model

Each layer of the model will be explained brieﬂy. First, the Network layer
“represents the basic communication between system actors. Each system actor
must have basic capabilities to connect to other actors” (Lewis et al., 2013, p.
1187). The second layer, Communication, “enables the basic common exchange
capability between any systems actors. Communication is deﬁned by elements such
as meaning, syntax, protocols, and semantics.” It is important to note that this
research exists between the ﬁrst two layers of the HARMS model. Then, the
Interaction layer “represents a set of commonly developed algorithms and
techniques which provide a layer for group rational decision making”. The
Organization layer “uses multiagent systems organization models” to provide roles
to accomplish one or more goals. Finally, the Collective Intelligence layer “will not
only allow emergent behaviors, but also the connection of multiple organizations
into higher-level collectives such as societies or organizations, and potentially a
deﬁnition of consciousness” (Lewis et al., 2013, p. 1187).
The HARMS model provides a real-world basis for which multiagent robotic
networks can be assembled for task completion. Previous research has been
successful in creating mobile wireless mesh networks in disaster areas to help
provide relief (Nguyen et al., 2012). Rescue robots can utilize the HARMS model
very eﬀectively, because there might be robots of diﬀerent sizes and designs needed
to provide disaster relief or rescue operations simultaneously. In other words, one
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type of robot alone may not be suﬃcient in providing assistance on an adequate
level. Fireﬁghting robots provide a good example of this and will become the focus
for this thesis. The next section will provide a brief overview of ﬁreﬁghting robots,
both used individually and as a part of a larger network. Fireﬁghting robotic
networks such as the one developed by Min et al. (2014) will be studied in more
detail in the following sections.

2.2 Introduction to Fireﬁghting Robots
The use of robotics in ﬁreﬁghting applications is a relatively recent
advancement. This section will provide details on the history of ﬁreﬁghting robots,
the research that was done to develop them, and how they are used today. This
includes commercial, military, and research applications. Furthermore, the concept
of using multiple ﬁreﬁghting robots together in a single ﬁre event is discussed.
These multiagent ﬁreﬁghting robotic networks are important to keep in mind, as
they provide signiﬁcant security implications.

2.2.1 History & Research
Although the concept of a ﬁreﬁghting robot was ﬁrst mentioned in the early
1960s (Thring, 1963), the ﬁrst functional robot to combat ﬁre appeared twenty
years later (Kobayashi & Nakamura, 1983). This project, lead by a Japan Industrial
Robot Association (JIRA) committee, deﬁned several functions for the robot:
inspection, refuge guidance, and rescue work. Based on these design decisions, the
committee designed a small ground vehicle with two parallel continuous tracks, or
tank treads in diﬀerential drive conﬁguration. One such design was controlled via
wireless radio waves from a human controller (see Figure 2.2). Another potential
design included a microphone, speaker, and wide-angle lens. This is signiﬁcant
because the tank-like ground vehicle robot design (typically with some sort of
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autonomous and mobile control. Indeed, autonomous navigation was quickly
introduced as a design goal in subsequent research. A competition at New Mexico
Institute of Mining and Technology was started in 1999 to create an autonomous
robot that could navigate a maze and extinguish a candle (Schumacher, McVay, &
Landes, 1999). Although this is arguably not a “ﬁreﬁghting robot,” many research
and academic projects like it emerged. One such example is the 2003 IEEE
SoutheastCon Hardware Competition, where students had to build autonomous
robots to ﬁnd and extinguish simulated ﬁres (Dubel, Gongora, Bechtold, & Diaz,
2003).
Fireﬁghting robots are not always vehicular, however. Researchers in Norway
designed a snake-like (or hose-like) robot called Anna Konda, which has the water
pressure to break walls (Bless, 2006). Another recent example is the humanoid
robot developed by the Naval Research Laboratory, the Shipboard Autonomous
Fireﬁghting Robot, or SAFFiR. These researchers, in cooperation with Virginia
Tech and the University of Pennsylvania created a humanoid ﬁreﬁghting robot to
“enable more robust performance in diﬃcult environments” as it attempts to mimic
the ways humans walk and operate as ﬁreﬁghters (Lahr, Orekhov, Lee, & Hong,
2013, p. 1).

2.2.2 Commercial Fireﬁghting Robots
Soon after research began on ﬁreﬁghting robots, ﬁre departments began
using them to help combat real-world ﬁres. A market was created for commercial
ﬁreﬁghting robots, and several robots were quickly introduced for individuals and
municipalities to purchase worldwide. The Tokyo Fire Department, where some of
the earliest ﬁreﬁghting robotics research began, employs 12 diﬀerent ﬁreﬁghting
robots as of 2011, including the Robocue, which is a large tank-like, vehicular robot
used in rescue operations to save people and move large objects (Heller, 2011). A
robotics company based in Croatia, DOK-ING, oﬀers a large remote-controlled
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ﬁreﬁghting robot, the MVF-5 (“MVF-5”, n.d.). The MVF-5 allows a human user to
operate it remotely from up to 1,500 meters away, while providing six video feeds
that the operator can control. This particular robot, pictured in 2.3, also allows
supports diﬀerent water hookup sources, including from ﬁre trucks and ﬁre hydrants.

Figure 2.3.: The DOK-ING MVF-5 ﬁreﬁghting robot (“MVF-5”, n.d.)

Another commercially available robot, the Howe and Howe Technologies’
Thermite (Plackett, 2012), has the ability to extinguish ﬁre using a 600
gallon-per-minute hose and costing around $97,000. This robot, which started as a
U.S. Department of Homeland Security project, became commercially available in
2012. Recently, ﬁre departments in the United States have adapted use of
ﬁreﬁghting robots in various capacities. During a wildﬁre around Yosemite National
Park in 2013, the National Guard used an unmanned aircraft to help provide aerial
views of the park (Skoloﬀ & Cone, 2013). Although not speciﬁcally a ﬁreﬁghting
robot, the use of unmanned vehicles to aid in ﬁreﬁghting has quickly grown in
popularity. Seen in early 2015, ﬁreﬁghters in Arlington, Texas, used unmanned
hoses to help cool the source of a ﬁre and used a robot to observe ﬂames and heat
levels (Davis, 2015).
Examples like these, along with cases of ﬁreﬁghting robots used in Alaska and
Oregon (B. Smith, 2014) seem to indicate a general trend toward increasing the use
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of robots, drones, or other unmanned vehicles to provide aid or completely replace
human ﬁreﬁghters. Indeed, it is the goal of the Fire Protection Research Foundation
(FPRA), a research arm of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) to
have “all ﬁreﬁghting apparatus and equipment used by emergency responders. . . not
in physical contact with the individual when operational”(Grant, 2014, p. 52).

2.2.3 Multiagent Fireﬁghting Robots
Once robots successfully demonstrated that they could perform certain basic
tasks, research increased to more advanced tasks and began exploring the possibility
of using more than one robot at once to achieve a common goal (Weiss, 1999).
Multiagent robots or Multi-Agent Systems (MASs) provided a way to distribute the
workload to not only perform tasks more quickly than before, but also taking
advantages of using design diﬀerences in certain individual robots to decide which
agent was best suited for a particular sub-task, allowing MASs to also complete
more complicated tasks. When using multiagent robotics, organizing an authority
hierarchy is important (Esmaeili, Mozayani, & Motlagh, 2014), because it creates
social organizations similar to humans. Of course, multiagent robotics was soon
applied to the domain of ﬁreﬁghting.
By the turn of the century, academic and government research identiﬁed
problems with ﬁreﬁghting robots. Hisanori Amano, a researcher at the National
Research Institute of Fire and Disaster in Japan noted that although ﬁre
departments had already begun to utilize ﬁreﬁghting robots, the current robots were
not designed with ﬁre department needs in mind (Amano, 2002). Many of them
were too large or weighed too much, causing mobility issues and limiting them in
certain areas. Furthermore, these robots were very expensive due in part because
private companies were not interested in developing robots for a small, niche
market. Amano concluded that the next generation of ﬁreﬁghting robots would be
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not one solution but a group of robots of various sizes and functions utilized by ﬁrst
responders (Amano, 2002).
A couple of years later, research was presented on a network of ﬁreﬁghting
robots. The authors envisioned “a physical network that can sense, move, compute,
and reason, letting network users (ﬁreﬁghters and ﬁrst responders)” to search for
information about the environment (Kumar, Rus, & Singh, 2004, p. 24). Their
initial experiment used a small network of sensors with radio tags that the robots
can communicate with to localize and build a map of the room. The robots
communicated with each other using the IEEE 802.11b wireless networking
speciﬁcation, however it is not mentioned whether or not the communication was
encrypted or secured in any way.

Figure 2.4.: The Dongil ﬁeld robot FIRO-M combating ﬁre in Hoopeston, Illinois
(Min et al., 2014)

Related to this project, previous research with multiagent ﬁreﬁghting robots
has been successful in combating real-world ﬁre. This research allows HARMS
model networks to be created for disaster relief situations. It was put to the test in
July 2013 in Hoopeston, Illinois, with a large-scale ﬁre of a tire recycling plant,
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some 400,000 sq. ft. large. Researchers sent in a Dongil Field Robot FIRO-M
(pictured in 2.4), which was able to reach places within the building that were not
accessible to human ﬁreﬁghters (Min et al., 2014). In order to create a multiagent
network, a leader role is assigned to one of the robots, while the others become
followers. The leader “computes navigation trajectories to create the network”
which is then communicated to the follower robots. The communication here is
done via the IEEE 802.11 wireless speciﬁcation, but security of the communication
is not considered. This project concluded that the “results show promise for
developing quickly conﬁgured networks” for use with buildings such as the one in
Hoopeston, Illinois (Min et al., 2014, pp. 6).
A group of European researchers looked at a slightly diﬀerent subset of
ﬁreﬁghting robots working together in a network. This project involved “swarm
robotics,” which diﬀers from a multiagent robotic network because all robotic
members are homogeneous, or of the same type and build and the structure of the
network is decentralized. These robots are small and somewhat underpowered when
looking at a single robot’s abilities, but work together to provide a large amount of
telemetry and useful statistical data to ﬁrst responders during an event (Naghsh,
Gancet, Tanoto, & Roast, 2008). The authors state that one of the problems they
encountered with the project was a communication overhead, where members of the
swarm had to conﬁrm the position of various other robots throughout the task.
This highlights an important potential vulnerability for robotic networks. Because
having reliable information on where members are at any given time is critical in an
emergency response scenario, adversaries who can deceive these robots into
accepting incorrect or falsiﬁed information would severely impact these robots’
abilities.
Indeed, there are several security concerns when dealing with swarm robotics
or multiagent networks. In particular, wireless communication using radio waves are
susceptible to interception or tampering (Higgins, Tomlinson, & Martin, 2009).
Convincing robots or humans of individual identity or group identity can also be
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potentially diﬃcult, and results in an identify-friend-or-foe (IFF) situation.
According to these researchers, robots used in disaster relief have a primary security
requirement of availability:
If robots are unavailable due to malfunction, accident or because they
have been hijacked either physically or electronically by an external
agency, then they will be unable to perform their critical task.
Conﬁdentiality could be necessary to safeguard information about
entities that the robots come across, such information could be highly
sensitive or of other interest to malicious parties (Higgins et al., 2009,
pp. 310-311).
Although swarm robotics diﬀer slightly from multiagent robotic networks, it is still
important to consider these security challenges. The next section of this literature
review will begin to detail one such attack vector that this project hopes to address.

2.3 The MiG-in-the-Middle Attack
The man-in-the-middle attack, previously mentioned in the last chapter, is a
common attack vector whenever two or more actors or systems communicate with
one another. A man-in-the-middle attack is performed when an adversary can
intercept or capture communication from one of the parties without the awareness
of any party involved (“Man-in-the-middle attack”, 2014). The adversary may not
do anything other than capture and record the communication which otherwise is
assumed to be private, or the adversary may attempt to actively alter the
communication as it travels from one party to the other. This attack can be
performed in many diﬀerent situations, including wireless communication between
systems and Web traﬃc. It is important to note that encryption alone cannot stop
a man-in-the-middle attack, which will be discussed in more detail shortly.
Information security researcher Ross Anderson talks not about robotic
networks, but military air defence forces. In order to develop a system to
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identify-friend-or-foe (IFF), he states: “the typical air defense system sends random
challenges with its radar signals, and friendly aircraft have equipment and keys that
enable them to identify themselves with correct responses” (Anderson, 2008, p. 73).
However, one way to circumvent this solution, which was demonstrated in real-world
combat situations, was for adversaries to capture the correct responses and replay
them to the air defense system as their own. Speciﬁcally, if the adversary can place
himself or herself in between the two authorized points of communication and relay
messages from one to the other, he or she can perform a man-in-the-middle attack.
The attack as Anderson describes it is as follows: South African forces were
ﬁghting a war in the 1980s in northern Namibia and southern Angola, with Cuban
forces helping their Angolan allies. Cuban forces, ﬂying MiG aircraft, were nearby a
South African air base. When the South African bombers left there to attack an
Angolan target, the Cuban MiGs ﬂew through the South African air defenses where
they could receive South African IFF challenge messages that were encrypted. The
MiGs sent them to the Angolan defense, who was presently engaged in combat with
the South African bombers, and the Angolans broadcast these IFF messages out.
The South African bombers sent their automated responses back, since their IFF
equipment was left on and were in the appropriate vicinity. The Angolans were able
to relay the responses back to the Cuban MiGs; the Cuban MiGs could now answer
the IFF challenge correctly and were therefore left untouched, where they were able
to carry out a successful bombing raid (Anderson, 2008).
This story, whether true in South Africa or elsewhere, illustrates an
important point. Implementing sound cryptographic techniques to secure
communication does not guarantee that the system is actually secure. In the
MiG-in-the-middle example, the Cuban MiGs had no idea what the IFF challenge
response was. They just understood that if they could capture a correct response,
they could replay it and the system would accept it. The next section will discuss
the extent to which these network attacks occur and how costly they can be.
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2.4 Prevalence of Network Attacks
Ross Anderson’s story of the middleperson attack in South Africa is not the
only successful example of the attack during combat. In World War II, German
bombers would shut oﬀ their transmitters during air raids. The British then turned
on their high power transmitter, called Aspidistra, and began transmitting on the
same frequency as the bombers would have used if they were on. The British would
start by simply retransmitting the German network broadcast occurring from
another source, but then would quickly change to convincing but false pro-Allied
propaganda. Due to how authentic the transmission sounded, many German
personnel believed them, causing confusion and even convincing “people to evacuate
to seven bomb-free zones in central and southern Germany” (Schneier, 2008, p. 1).
Perhaps the most well-known and widely-discussed example of malware used
in cyberwar, the Stuxnet worm, also uses a middleperson attack in one component
of its complicated process. According to Larry Constantine, an author in the ﬁelds
of computer science and cybersecurity, Stuxnet was able to cause damage to so
many of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges due to a man-in-the-middle attack it performed
against the industrial control system (Cherry, 2011). This was corroborated for an
older version of Stuxnet in a Symantec report from 2013 (McDonald, Murchu,
Doherty, & Chien, 2013).
The Electronic Frontier Foundation reported a middleperson attack against
Google in Iran in 2011. Here, a certiﬁcate authority issued a certiﬁcate to an
adversary for an Iranian Google page. This meant that although users tried to
access Google with HTTPS, an encrypted version of the web page, it was not
actually Google but rather a malicious third-party. This third-party was able to
convince Iranian users to log in to their email accounts and perform potentially
sensitive searches while they were able to intercept all traﬃc to and from Google
(Schoen & Galperin, 2011).
Attacks against speciﬁc nation-states or for speciﬁc political reasons are on
the rise. These attacks might leverage existing services such as Google or mobile
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phone networks, but attacks against critical infrastructure are also gaining
popularity. In 2013, researchers at the Technical Unit for Energy and Environmental
Modeling in Rome, Italy modeled certain cyber attacks on components of critical
infrastructure they identiﬁed. In fact, man-in-the-middle attacks are one of the
most popular vectors for adversaries and the authors discuss the potential
consequences from such an attack (Ciancamerla, Minichino, & Palmieri, 2013).
Speciﬁcally, as much as 30% of the system was found to be aﬀected by a
middleperson attack at the end of their experiment, modeled and exploited with
relative ease and success. This highlights a large problem with critical infrastructure
security, which is discussed in detail in the next section. Since ﬁre departments and
ﬁrst responders of situations involving ﬁre are considered a part of critical
infrastructure, it is signiﬁcant to consider what may happen in the near future.

2.5 Security in Critical Infrastructure and First Response Technology
In 1998, the President of the United States released a Presidential Decision
Directive calling for the ﬁrst time, protection of critical infrastructure (The Clinton
Administration’s Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Presidential Directive
63 , 1998). This document states that critical infrastructure, including
telecommunications, transportation, and emergency systems such as police and ﬁre
services have growing potential vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the White House
stated:
Because of our military strength, future enemies, whether nations,
groups or individuals, may seek to harm us in non-traditional ways
including attacks within the United States. Because our economy is
increasingly reliant upon interdependent and cyber-supported
infrastructures, non-traditional attacks on our infrastructure and
information systems may be capable of signiﬁcantly harming both our
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military power and our economy (The Clinton Administration’s Policy on
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Presidential Directive 63 , 1998, p. 1).
After the attacks on the World Trade Center buildings in New York on
September 11, 2001, the United States created the Department of Homeland
Security “to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover
from terrorist attacks within the United States” (National Strategy for Homeland
Security, 2002, p. 1). Within the Department of Homeland Security, the Oﬃce of
Infrastructure Protection was created. According to the Department of Homeland
Security’s website: “The oﬃce conducts and facilitates vulnerability and
consequence assessments to help critical infrastructure owners and operators and
State, local, tribal, and territorial partners understand and address risks to critical
infrastructure” (“Oﬃce of Infrastructure Protection”, 2014, p. 1). Furthermore, the
President updated PDD-63 by releasing the Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 7, where the Secretary of Homeland Security is “responsible for
coordinating the overall national eﬀort to enhance the protection of the critical
infrastructure” (Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 , 2003, p. 2).
Indeed, the United States federal government seems to be right to worry. As
new cyberwar abilities continue to develop, the overall trend in attacks to critical
infrastructure is rising. In 2012, the number of attacks reported to the Department
of Homeland Security’s Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response
Team (ICS-CERT) grew by 52% (Goldman, 2013). Recent research stated that
nearly 70% of critical infrastructure companies (those that provide “power, water,
and other critical functions”) reported one or more security breaches in 2013 alone
(Unisys, 2014).
A speciﬁc attack reported by ICS-CERT in 2012 was against the computer
networks of natural gas pipeline companies in the United States. It appeared to
start as early as December 2011 and was primarily conducted through targeted
phishing emails sent to personnel within these companies (Brenner, 2012). More
recently, a cyberattack on a steel mill in Germany was able to cause physical
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damage to the plant via remotely controlling and disrupting critical systems (Zetter,
2015). These examples illustrate the variety of attack vectors possible against
critical infrastructure and how necessary it is to begin securing our critical
infrastructure technology today.

2.6 Summary
This chapter provided a look at pre-existing research done to develop the
HARMS model, a way to eﬀectively build a network of multiagent ﬁreﬁghting
robots. As we went through the history of robots designed for ﬁreﬁghting, we
learned that they can largely beneﬁt from working together with many robots in a
network, but this concept introduces security vulnerabilities that have been
previously seen and exploited successfully. Therefore, it is important to secure this
network now, rather than waiting until it is an afterthought. Fireﬁghters and
ﬁreﬁghting robots are considered critical infrastructure, and it is crucial to secure
our nation’s infrastructure against attack, because without it, there are signiﬁcant
consequences to our economy, safety and well-being.
Unfortunately, attacks against critical infrastructure are on the rise and are
projected to continue to do so. Therefore, it will only become more diﬃcult to
prevent adversaries from successfully breaking into technology that we depend on as
our nation’s backbone. However, it is still early on, and as echoed by Higgins et al.
(2009), little work has been done to previously secure networks of multiagent
robotics. The next chapter provides the framework and methodology to be used in
this research project.
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CHAPTER 3. FRAMEWORK & METHODOLOGY
This chapter provides the framework and methodology used in the research
study. Details on the implemented solution are provided, including justiﬁcation on
why this solution was chosen. The hypotheses are presented, and further
information on testing is provided. This sets up the ability to test this solution and
provide results and analysis in this next chapter. This chapter will also include the
measure for success, variables to consider, and methods of data collection. A
framework for this research is discussed for repeatable future experiments.

3.1 Research Approach and Hypotheses
This project was a quantitative study on the feasibility of securing
communication between system actors of a HARMS-model network. As discussed
previously, a system actor is a human, software agent, robot, machine, or sensor
participating in a HARMS network. This project main goal was to secure
communication of any HARMS-model actors, including a primary focus on an
implementation for ﬁreﬁghting robots, developed in previous research. The
apparatus for this project included multiple machines, such as computers and robots
that are compatible or comparable to the previously developed ﬁreﬁghting robots
(used as a proof-of-concept). The technology used for communication, including any
remote controls or wireless technology, communication protocol, and security
mechanisms was also a part of the apparatus. These communication details are
generalizable to any robotic network using the HARMS model.
Furthermore, technology to capture wireless traﬃc was utilized during the
experiment phase of this research. This was used to simulate an adversary’s attempt
to capture traﬃc from a member of the network, either to learn information about
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what was sent or to perform an active man-in-the-middle or replay attack. It is
important to distinguish between plaintext and ciphertext messages. Plaintext
messages can be in natural language text for human readability or in text/binary
form for machine computation. On the other hand, ciphertext is the encrypted
version of the plaintext. It is not human readable and must be decrypted before a
machine can perform any computation or analysis. See Table 3.1 for examples of
this process.
Table 3.1: Examples of plaintext messages encrypted with two diﬀerent cryptographic
algorithms
Plaintext

Ciphertext (MD5)

AES Ciphertext (Base-64)

Fireﬁghter

b74ad4852301652bdbe405413f9a4b49

tfUhMshE82IZCpmNIMHacg==

Robot

5d1eca158c00250d9c4c32d947b7c433

MDoWBb58V8a89UNkUYHuHw==

HARMS

4ae8bcd72369803429490559f21a541b

Q1HqHglXVvA0mvdqOrnfMg==

This study looked to answer whether or not communication between
authenticated system actors can be secured against man-in-the-middle attacks. As
previously discussed in sections 1.5 and 1.6, other types of network attacks were
considered outside the scope of this study.

3.1.1 Hypotheses
The hypotheses for this study were the following:
H0,1 : The conﬁdentiality of messages sent between authenticated system
actors in a HARMS-model network cannot be maintained in the event of
an adversary capturing communication.
Hα,1 : The conﬁdentiality of messages sent between authenticated system
actors in a HARMS-model network can be eﬀectively maintained even in
the event of an adversary capturing communication.
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H0, 2 : A HARMS-model network cannot be secured against any
man-in-the-middle attacks by an adversary.
Hα, 2 : A HARMS-model network can be eﬀectively secured against a
man-in-the-middle attack from an adversary.

3.2 Testing Methodology
The two null hypotheses provide the two major goals of secure
communication via HARMS: conﬁdentiality and authentication. During the
experiment, both factors must be accounted for and protected in order to
successfully reject the null hypotheses. The experiment consisted of two major tests
in three scenarios that modeled real-world examples of tasks ﬁreﬁghting robots and
HARMS system actors would typically see. In each scenario, an active
man-in-the-middle attack was demonstrated prior to securing the HARMS
communication. A replay attack was also demonstrated to demonstrate a lesser (but
sometimes just as damaging) attack that also requires an adversary in between the
sender and recipient. The same attacks were demonstrated after the security had
been added as the experiment. The scenarios are as follows.

3.2.1 Scenario 1
In the ﬁrst scenario, two computer nodes were communicating via HARMS.
These computers existed as virtual machines that simulated commands that would
typically be seen in a large-scale enterprise environment with sensors for things like
temperature, humidity, and other physical building environment parameters. As an
example, consider the heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) system of a
large warehouse or commercial building. These systems typically employ sensors for
not only temperature and humidity, as well as smoke and carbon monoxide
detectors for ﬁre prevention. When these distributed sensors take readings, they can
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be communicated in many diﬀerent ways, including decentralized large-scale
networks and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems.
In a scenario where various sensor readings are communicated to one or more
nodes of a network, it is crucial that data being sent is not tampered with or
changed in any way. If a malicious entity were able to gain access to the
communications, they could perform a man-in-the-middle attack to change the
information being sent, or send new commands that could cause signiﬁcant damage,
such as activating ﬁre sprinklers or turning oﬀ air conditioning systems. This
scenario is just an example, but has recently become an increased target of
cybercriminals. According to an FBI memo, an air conditioning company in New
Jersey was compromised when attackers gained access to their incident command
system (“Is your HVAC (air conditioning) the next SCADA target?”, 2013). Also,
although outside the scope of this project’s scenario, a consideration of the security
of a system like HVAC is important because these systems can often times be used a
pivot where the adversary compromises these systems ﬁrst and then attacks more
critical systems afterward, as was the case in the famous Target data breach in
November 2013 (Krebs, 2014).
Therefore, for this experiment, the ﬁrst scenario involved computers
communicating via HARMS. Their communications simulated sensor output being
sent back to a command and control server. A man-in-the-middle attack was
demonstrated to change the content of what was being sent. As an example,
machine A sent ”Temperature: 85 degrees F” to machine B, simulating a warm
environment of a server room that requires air conditioning to be activated.
However, the man-in-the-middle attack changed the contents to read ”Temperature:
65 degrees F”, which means that machine B did not turn on the air conditioning.
This is a simulation of an attack that could cause failure of the machines in that
server room due to overheating. A replay attack was also demonstrated by
capturing the plaintext contents of the message and sending them an arbitrary
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amount of times. The secure communication was added, and the man-in-the-middle
and replay attacks were run again to demonstrate they are longer feasible.

3.2.2 Scenario 2
The second scenario was also modeled on a real-world situation at the heart
of ﬁreﬁghting robot operation. Fireﬁghting robots can be issued commands via a
human-operated remote control or from one or more system actors of a HARMS
network. In either case, a command on how the robot should move or what task
should be accomplished was sent. Again, the security of these commands is vital to
the operation of the ﬁreﬁghting robots and the mission, because if the commands
were altered, the ﬁre could spread and cause more damage or loss of life. In this
scenario, a ground vehicle robot was issued commands via HARMS for basic
movement, such as moving forward, turning left or right, etc. A man-in-the-middle
attack was demonstrated as in the ﬁrst scenario to change the command such that
the robot moved in an unpredictable and unwanted way. A replay attack was also
demonstrated to arbitrarily move the robot in undesirable ways without needing
communication from an authorized actor. Again, secure communication was added,
and the attacks were repeated to demonstrate they are no longer feasible.

3.2.3 Scenario 3
The ﬁnal scenario demonstrated the ability to use multicast and broadcast
messages in a HARMS network. In the previous two scenarios, messages were sent
as unicast, which means that there was one sender and exactly one recipient.
Multicast messages are intended for multiple recipients, which the sender can
specify. Broadcast messages are sent to all known peers of the HARMS network.
The third scenario combined the machines used in the previous two scenarios and
focused on messages that are sent via multicast and broadcast. This scenario was
meant to indicate that the proposed solution is generalizable to multiple pairs of
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HARMS actors. Like before, a man-in-the-middle attack and a replay attack were
both run on the unsecured communication. After the secure communication, the
attacks were attempted again, although this time they were unsuccessful.

3.2.4 Implications
The man-in-the-middle attack used in all three scenarios tests the
capabilities of both conﬁdentiality and authentication of the HARMS network. The
property of conﬁdentiality, keeping information secret from entities that do not have
authority to see it, is important to maintain in communication because there is no
inherent safeguards preventing an adversary from capturing wireless communication
and analyzing or using it. If an adversary can see and understand communication
sent, he or she can change it in unexpected ways. Furthermore, the ability to change
a message indicates a lack authentication; that is, the property of having authority
to be a member of the network and eﬀectively being allowed to send and receive
communications.
Man-in-the-middle attacks can be performed with varying degrees of severity.
As seen in the MiG-in-the-middle example, adversaries were able to capture
communication used to authenticate the opponent. They relayed these messages
and were able to deceive the system and masquerade as an ally, not a foe. This is
also known as a replay attack, but it’s important to note that the adversaries had to
be actively capturing traﬃc and relaying it, making it valid only in that moment.
They couldn’t have simply captured traﬃc from some event and replayed it at any
time to gain access. Simple replay attacks are not as advanced but can be just as
successful, meaning these attacks should not be discounted.
In fact, replay attacks, in any capacity, test authentication of the HARMS
network even when conﬁdentiality is achieved. Here, if an adversary can send
messages that appear to be valid, even when he or she cannot understand the
communication being sent, is still a signiﬁcant vulnerability. In other words, even if
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the IFF messages in the MiG-in-the-middle example were encrypted, they would
still be susceptible to a replay attack without other safeguards in place to allow
messages to expire. Another variety of a man-in-the-middle attack involves changing
the contents of the message in between the sender and the recipient. This can be
done when conﬁdentiality and authentication are not present, and an adversary can
change the contents of a message directly while in transit. The man-in-the-middle
attacks described here were attempted to the best of their ability in the scenarios
described in the previous sections.

3.3 Implemented Solution
The solution to secure the communication within the HARMS system
addressed both the issues of conﬁdentiality and authentication. Conﬁdentiality is
achieved by implementing cryptographic functions on messages that are sent
between peers. Not only are the contents of the messages encrypted, but integrity
(and non-repudiation) of the message is provided with a cryptographic hash
function, called a keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC). This requires a
secret secret to compute that only authorized users would have. Both the
encryption of the message as well as the hash function require symmetric
cryptographic keys. Therefore, a key exchange protocol is required to establish these
keys for each pair of peers that want to communicate. This was achieved via a form
of the Diﬃe-Hellman Key Agreement Method (Rescorla, 1999).

3.3.1 Diﬃe-Hellman Key Agreement
Keys for both the cryptographic protocol as well as the message
authentication code must be negotiated for all pairs of peers separately. Each time
symmetric keys need to be negotiated for a new pair of peers, a Diﬃe-Hellman Key
Agreement (DHKA) process occurs, as described here.
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1. Peer 1 generates a prime generator g, a large prime number p, and a private
value a.
2. Peer 1 computes A = g a mod p and sends g, p, and A (the result) to Peer 2. It
is important to note that Peer 1 keeps a secret.
3. Peer 2 generates its own secret, b, and uses g and p to compute B = g b mod p.
4. Peer 2 sends B to Peer 1 but keeps b secret.
5. Peer 2 computes the shared secret Z = g ab mod p by calculating Ab mod p.
6. Peer 1 meanwhile computes the shared secret Z = g ab mod p by calculating
B a mod p.
After the Diﬃe-Hellman Key Agreement concludes for this pair of peers,
they each now have an identical shared secret, unique to that pair of peers. Peer 1
and Peer 2 both take the shared secret and feed it as input into an HMAC-based
Key Derivation Function (HKDF), deriving from it an arbitrary number of
cryptographically-strong secret keys (Krawczyk & Eronen, 2010). Both Peer 1 and
Peer 2 use the same shared secret from the DHKA into as well as identical (and
optional) other parameters to the function known as the “info” and the “salt”.
Afterward, Peer 1 and Peer 2 now have identical cryptographically-strong keys for
both encryption and message authentication.
There are several things that are important to note. The inherent security of
the shared secret negotiated after the Diﬃe-Hellman Key Agreement relies on the
hardness of the Decision Diﬃe-Hellman (DDH) problem (Boneh, 1998). This
assumes that no eﬃcient algorithm can distinguish between g a , g b , g ab  and
g a , g b , g c . In other words, given the values g a , g b , and g c , it is computationally
infeasible to determine whether or not g c = g ab . A related problem is the
Computational Diﬃe-Hellman (CDH) problem, which is given g a and g b , it is
computationally infeasible to calculate g ab . Both of these problems provide
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assurance that an adversary cannot eavesdrop on a Diﬃe-Hellman Key Agreement
session and learn the shared secret.
In this solution, each pair of peers need to ﬁrst negotiate cryptographic keys
via DHKA before they can begin to communicate with each other. The keys for
encrypted messages as well as message authentication are valid for that session; the
pair of peers can use them while they communicate, but whenever the program is
run in future scenarios, each pair must re-negotiate keys via DHKA. This leads to a
desirable property of the cryptographic keys. Furthermore, in this solution, the
negotiated keys are known as ephemeral, in that they are only used for a speciﬁc
session and not written to a ﬁle or used again for future sessions.

3.3.2 Message Encryption and Authentication
After session keys are negotiated via a Diﬃe-Hellman Key Agreement
process (described in the previous subsection), a pair of peers can now utilize strong
cryptographic protocols to provide conﬁdentiality and authentication. Messages are
transformed in the following way:
1. Peer 1 wants to send a message M to Peer 2.
2. Peer 1 computes the HMAC of M using the HMAC session key negotiated for
Peer 2 (the hash algorithm used in this solution is SHA-256).
3. Peer 1 concatenates HMAC(M ) with M itself.
4. Peer 1 encrypts the concatenation with AES (128-bit key size, CBC mode of
operation, PKCS #5 Padding) i.e., AESDH (HM ACDH (M ) + M ).
5. Peer 2 receives the ciphertext and decrypts using the AES session key
negotiated for Peer 1.
6. Peer 2 computes the HMAC of M using the HMAC session key negotiated for
Peer 1.
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7. If the computed HMAC matches the HMAC provided in the plaintext of the
transmission, Peer 2 accepts the message from Peer 1.
Message authentication relies on two factors. First, an adversary would need
to compromise the encryption of the transmission to access the message and the
HMAC output in the ﬁrst place. This is assumed a very diﬃcult problem, as no
attacks are known to break the AES algorithm when implemented correctly other
than a fully exhaustive search, which is considered computationally infeasible
(Biryukov, Dunkelman, Keller, Khovratovich, & Shamir, 2009). Second, even if the
encryption can be broken by an adversary who wanted to change the contents of the
message, the adversary would have to recompute the HMAC using the session key
(which he or she does not have access to, as discussed in the previous subsection) or
brute force an appropriate HMAC such that the message is validated. Collision
resistance, the property where a certain hash output can be generated for a given
plaintext input without actually computing the hash (i.e., without having the key)
is strong for SHA-256, this solution’s underlying hash function for the HMAC. In
fact, no known collisions exist for the SHA-2 family (Schneier, 2012). Note that
because session keys are negotiated for each pair of peers, even authenticated
members of the HARMS network could not tamper with the authentication of
messages unless they were the sender or recipient of the message itself.

3.3.3 Protections Against Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
The previous two subsections oﬀer conﬁdentiality and message
authentication for communication in a HARMS network. Man-in-the-middle attacks
by adversaries or even HARMS users that are not directly involved in the
transmission of the message are no longer possible with the message itself. However,
two attack vectors still exist. First, adversaries can perform a man-in-the-middle
attack on the Diﬃe-Hellman Key Agreement process itself (see Figure 3.1). Here,
the adversary exists in between the two peers during DHKA and eﬀectively
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is similar to the notion of pre-shared keys used in the Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
protocol found in IPSec (Kaufman, Hoﬀman, Nir, Eronen, & Kivinen, 2014). This
cryptosystem not only provides ephemeral session keys, as discussed in Section
3.3.1, but it also has the property of forward secrecy, in that session keys cannot be
compromised even in the event that the pre-shared key is compromised. In other
words, if an adversary captures messages encrypted using this solution and also
cracks or otherwise discovers the pre-shared key, he or she still cannot decrypt the
contents of the messages, as the Diﬃe-Hellman Key Agreement process does not
disclose anything that an adversary can use to construct the session keys.
The second attack vector to consider is the concept of a middleperson
capturing traﬃc to be able to relay to another node or replay in some way. For
example, even when a message is properly encrypted and authenticated between a
sender and recipient, if the session is still active, then the session keys are still valid.
An adversary who captures that traﬃc and replays it during that session will force
the recipient to verify the message a second time. To provide a real-world scenario
for this attack vector, consider a remote-controlled electric lock for a door. A
cryptographically-secured message is sent to the door to unlock and open, and the
door shuts automatically shortly thereafter. If an adversary captured the command,
although encrypted, to the door control, the adversary could still open the door by
simply replaying the encrypted message.
In order to protect against this very simple attack, a timestamp is added to
the message. As long as the message has occurred within an acceptable threshold of
time and the HMAC is veriﬁed, the message is considered valid. For the purposes of
this solution, four seconds is considered an acceptable threshold (see Section 4.4 for
details). Note that this solution requires synchronized time between all HARMS
actors to maintain functionality.
The following steps summarize the full solution implementation. Note that
“PSK” stands for pre-shared key, and “E” denotes encryption via AES with a
128-bit key in CBC mode of operation with PKCS #5 Padding (Kaliski, 2000),

35
when appropriate. “D” denotes decryption of AES with the same parameters, and
“H” denotes computing the mac output using HMAC-SHA-256. Finally, “DHA ”
and “DHH ” denote the session keys derived for AES encryption and HMAC
computation, negotiated via Diﬃe-Hellman Key Agreement.
1. Peer 1 sends Diﬃe Hellman public parameters EP SK (g), EP SK (p), and
EP SK (g a mod p) to Peer 2. Peer 1 keeps a private.
2. Peer 2 decrypts DP SK (EP SK (g)) to get g, DP SK (EP SK (p)) to get p, and
DP SK (EP SK (g a mod p)) to get g a mod p.
3. Once Peer 2 decrypts the public parameters, they are used to compute g b mod
p. Peer 2 keeps b private.
4. Peer 2 sends EP SK (g b mod p).
5. Peer 1 computes DP SK (EP SK (g b mod p)) to get g b mod p.
6. Both peers compute the shared secret Z = g ab mod p.
7. Both peers feed Z into the HKDF to obtain DHA and DHH , valid for that
session only.
8. Peer 1 wants to send a message to Peer 2. Peer 1 ﬁrst appends the current
time to the message, M = msg + time.
9. Peer 1 computes HDHH (M ).
10. Peer 1 sends EP SK (EDHA (HDHH (M ) + M )) to Peer 2.
11. Peer 2 computes DP SK (EP SK (EDHA (HDHH (M ) + M ))) to get
EDHA (HDHH (M ) + M ).
12. Peer 2 computes DDHA (EDHA (HDHH (M ) + M )) to get HDHH (M ) + M .
13. Peer 2 takes M and computes HDHH (M ). If it is not identical to what is in
step 12, the message is not valid.
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14. Peer 2 takes the current time and compares it to time inside M . If it not
within a conﬁgured threshold, the message is not valid.
15. If the message is valid, Peer 2 can perform an action or send a message to Peer
1 using steps 8 through 14 as needed.

3.4 Measure for Success
For each of the three scenarios, an active man-in-the-middle attack was run
on HARMS actors communicating in a HARMS network, ﬁrst without the secure
solution. It was expected that in all three scenarios, the man-in-the-middle attack
would be successful. This was performed as a proof-of-concept to demonstrate the
attack as it would occur in a realistic environment. The man-in-the-middle attack
was also ran on the secure solution. The measure for success for this project was to
see whether or not the attacks were successful after the secure communication was
in place.
The second null hypothesis, relating to authentication, was rejected if a
man-in-the-middle attack is considered computationally infeasible. This can be
shown by a failure to break the cryptographic algorithms in place by the solution or
a failure to perform a replay attack within a certain threshold of time. In other
words, H0,2 , was rejected if attacks were not successful in the amount of time
determined in the study. If these attacks were not successful, Hα,2 was accepted.

3.4.1 Data Collection
For each scenario, messages were sent one hundred times from one HARMS
actor to another. As discussed previously, this was done for each scenario twice:
once without secure communication, and once again with the secure solution. In all
cases, the messages and information about sender and recipient was captured. Also,
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an adversary attempted to capture traﬃc and sent responses to the correct HARMS
actor to bypass authentication and gain access to communication.

3.4.2 Variables
The independent variable in this study was the message that the robot
communicates. After secure communication was implemented, the independent
variable existed as the ciphertext.
The dependent variable in this study was the ability to read the message.
Furthermore, the dependent variable was the ability to capture a message.

3.5 Instrumentation
The technology used for all HARMS actors was a Java application, providing
an interface for system actors to add peers, send and receive unicast, multicast, or
broadcast data, and keep track of previously-sent messages. All scenarios utilized
HARMS in this Java application in both the original and secure versions.
To demonstrate the network attacks, another machine utilized standard
traﬃc sniﬃng and capture tools such as Wireshark and tcpdump.
Man-in-the-middle attacks were done via Ettercap. Replay attacks were
demonstrated by taking the raw contents of the captured packets and sending them
via netcat or in a Python script.

3.6 Threats
Interference or noise during wireless transmission were seen as a threat to
this experiment. If the experiments were performed with other wireless devices
nearby, there could have been interference or a signiﬁcant change in the
signal-to-noise ratio. Other threats included side-channel attacks and denial of
service attacks, which would have rendered communication unusable but were
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outside the scope of this project. Finally, because the experiments are a
proof-of-concept using robots that are similar but not identical to the ﬁreﬁghting
robots, changes might be need to occur when adapting the secure communication
developed here for use with the ﬁreﬁghting robots.

3.7 Summary
This chapter provided the framework and methodology used in this study.
First, two major goals of securing communication were identiﬁed: conﬁdentiality
and authentication. These set up two hypotheses that can be tested with an
experiment involving three diﬀerent scenarios. In each scenario, both a
man-in-the-middle attack as well as a replay attack were performed on the original
HARMS system and the secure solution implementation.
The ﬁrst scenario involved two virtual machines communicating with each
other, simulating a command and control environment with a temperature sensor.
The second scenario used a vehicular robot and a machine that provided commands
to move the robot in speciﬁed ways. The third scenario combined these machines to
test the multicast and broadcast capabilities of the HARMS system.
The secure solution was presented in this chapter, and it addresses the
security goals laid out previously. Conﬁdentiality is achieved using well-known,
standard cryptographic methods. Non-repudiation and message integrity are also
provided, making the solution robust to many diﬀerent attacks. Pre-shared keys
provide decentralized authentication in this system by indicating knowledge only
true system actors could have, a method of identity. Finally, a timestamp is added
to the message so that replay attacks against messages using even the most
sophisticated encryption is not possible. The next chapter provides details on the
results of the experiment performed as described by the methodology and
framework of this chapter.
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
After setting up the framework and methodology for this research in the
previous chapter, the experiment was run and data was collected. This chapter
discusses the results of the experiment under those conditions. Each section will
provide details on the experiment as it applies to each scenario, both with the
original implementation of the HARMS system as well as with the secure solution in
place. For each scenario, details on the attacks that are performed are given as a
proof-of-concept, and then that same attack was tested against the secure
communication solution. Each time, the results are summarized to indicate a
measure of success. Afterward, the results are analyzed to draw meaningful
conclusions based on the hypotheses that were provided in the previous chapter.
The following chapter will summarize the complete project and discuss future
research avenues.

4.1 Scenario 1
The ﬁrst scenario (see Table 4.1) involved using two virtual machines as
HARMS actors, “Alice” and “Bob”. Alice was simulating a temperature sensor in a
server room, and Bob was simulating the HVAC control for air conditioning. If the
server room temperature exceeds 82 degrees Fahrenheit, the air conditioning should
turn on to start cooling the room. To begin the test, 100 commands were sent from
Alice to Bob indicating the temperature of the server room as 85 degrees
Fahrenheit. An attacker “Mallory” was listening on the network and began a
man-in-the-middle attack.
The man-in-the-middle attack used by Mallory was two-fold. First, Mallory
listened to the communication sent between the two HARMS actors to ﬁrst
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Table 4.1: Properties of the two HARMS actors used in the ﬁrst scenario
Parameter
Name
IP Address
Operating System

Machine 1

Machine 2

alice

bob

192.168.121.128

192.168.121.129

Linux ubuntu 3.13.0-45-generic

CPU 2 Processors with 2 cores per processor (4 total cores)
RAM

2048 MB

Network Adapter

NAT

Java Version
VMWare Version
vmware-tools
Host

1.7.0 75
VMWare Workstation 11.1.0 build-2496824
9.9.2.44151 (build-2496486)
Windows 8.1 Pro, 64-bit (Build 9600) 6.3.9600

understand the message protocol. Figure 4.1 shows the message from a packet
capture using Wireshark. Mallory could see the contents of the message in plaintext
(i.e., unencrypted) and understood the organization of the message (i.e., how to
format the contents). Mallory began to change the contents of the message that
Bob saw such that the temperature of the server room was no longer reported
correctly. Speciﬁcally, Mallory used the exploitation tool Ettercap to write an
etterﬁlter for this attack. The ﬁlter was as follows:
if(ip.proto == TCP && tcp.dst == 8888){
if(search(DATA.data, "%CONT:Temperature: 85 degrees F")) {
replace("%CONT:Temperature: 85 degrees F",
"%CONT:Temperature: 65 degrees F");
msg("Filter has run. Detected 85 degrees");
}
}

43
attack with Ettercap, but this time it was unsuccessful in all attempts. This was due
to the fact that Mallory did not see the same information anymore when capturing
the traﬃc. Figure 4.2 indicates that Mallory could only see encrypted information.
In order to perform this man-in-the-middle attack, Mallory would need to
decrypt the contents of the message in order to replace certain words. As discussed
in Section 3.3.3, this requires removing two layers of AES encryption to get to the
message: one using the pre-shared key, and the other using the Diﬃe-Hellman
session key. Furthermore, Mallory would have to craft an HMAC of the message
once it is changed. This method can only be done via exhaustive key search, which
is computationally infeasible.
Table 4.2: The summary of the two network attacks demonstrated on the original
HARMS system (denoted as harms) as well as the implementation with secure
communication (denoted as harms-secure) for the ﬁrst scenario
harms

harms-secure

MitM Vulnerable

Yes

No

No. of attempted attacks

100

100

No. of successful attacks

100 (100%)

0 (0%)

Replay Vulnerable

Yes

No

No. of attempted attacks

100

100

No. of successful attacks

100 (100%)

0* (0%)

Mallory was forced to cut her loses and attempt only the simple replay
attack instead. She had captured the encrypted traﬃc as shown in Figure 4.2, so
she could replay this as she did with the unencrypted version. This failed to work,
however, due to the protections in place using current system time. Table 4.2
summarizes the results for Scenario 1. Please note, the asterisk placed near the 0%
eﬀectiveness of the replay attack for the secure HARMS system indicates that a
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replay attack is still theoretically possible if the adversary can beat the timing
threshold set in the program.

4.2 Scenario 2
The second scenario was similar in process to the previous one, but the two
machines used were quite diﬀerent. This was done intentionally to ensure that
HARMS communication and the secure solution work on a variety of machines.
Table 4.3 includes the details of these HARMS actors. Like in the ﬁrst scenario,
Table 4.3: Properties of the two HARMS actors used in the second scenario
Parameter
Name
IP Address
Operating System

Machine 1

Machine 2

micro

rasp

192.168.1.16

192.168.1.24

Windows 8.1 Pro 64-bit

Linux raspberrypi 3.12.22+

CPU ARM1176JZF-S (700 MHz)
RAM
Network Adapter
Java Version

Intel Core i5-3570K

16 GB

512 MB

Broadcom BCM57781

Edimax EW-7811Un

1.8.0 31

1.7.0 40

both a man-in-the-middle attack was demonstrated as well as a replay attack, using
traﬃc that an adversary (Mallory) captured. In this scenario, the replay attack is
actually more beneﬁcial, as it is easier to control the movements of a robot with
arbitrary commands than it is to wait for commands to come from a legitimate
sender to change.
To start, the machine “micro” sent commands to the robot “rasp” to
demonstrate basic movement. These commands included moving forward and
backward and moving left and right. These commands are very similar to how
ﬁreﬁghting robots would be commanded for navigation or locomotion in a real-world
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scenario in a HARMS network. Because these commands were sent via wireless
(IEEE 802.11 WiFi), Mallory could easily listen and capture traﬃc being sent to the
robot. For each of the four commands, 25 messages were sent to the robot
instructing it to move in that way. Mallory was able to perform the
man-in-the-middle attack via Ettercap, very similar to how it was achieved in the
previous scenario. The etterﬁlter used was:
if(ip.proto == TCP && tcp.dst == 8888){
if(search(DATA.data, "%CONT:go forward")) {
replace("%CONT:go forward", "%CONT:turn left);
msg("Filter has run. Detected going forward");
}
}
This etterﬁlter included checks for all four commands (forward, backward, left, and
right) sent to the robot and changed them to be a undesired command. Again, in
all 100 messages, the HARMS actors and network was susceptible to the attack.
Mallory then used a captured packet to replay commands to the robot in an
undesired manner. The robot saw that the packet stated it was from a known peer
“micro”, so it accepted the message as is. Table 4.4 summarizes the results of these
two attacks for the second scenario.
The secure communication solution was then put in place. Again, each
authorized actor needed the pre-shared key installed in order to communicate
properly. Once the pre-shared key was in place for both micro and rasp, the
machines communicated normally. Like in the previous scenario, Mallory was able
to view the contents of the messages, but they were encrypted and not discernible
without ﬁrst decrypting the contents. Furthermore, the encrypted contents
prevented Mallory from changing the contents, so the man-in-the-middle attack was
not successful. Mallory also failed to perform the replay attack, as she could not
capture traﬃc and replay it fast enough for the system to consider the message
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valid. Again, the asterisk in Table 4.4 indicates that in another version of this
experiment, an adversary could be successful if they were quick enough.
Table 4.4: The summary of both network attacks demonstrated on the original
HARMS system (harms) as well as the implementation with secure communication
(harms-secure) for the second scenario
No. of successful attacks

Man-in-the-middle attacks

Command

harms

harms-secure

move forward

25 (100%)

0 (0%)

move backward

25 (100%)

0 (0%)

turn left

25 (100%)

0 (0%)

turn right

25 (100%)

0 (0%)

100

100

move forward

25 (100%)

0* (0%)

move backward

25 (100%)

0* (0%)

turn left

25 (100%)

0* (0%)

turn right

25 (100%)

0* (0%)

100

100

No. of total attempted attacks
Replay attacks

No. of total attempted attacks
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4.3 Scenario 3
The last scenario used multiple machines of diﬀerent makes, capabilities, and
architectures to represent a true multiagent network. The HARMS actors used here,
summarized in Table 4.5, were mostly actors used in the previous two scenarios with
one new machine added. It is important to remember that the HARMS system
allows for each actor to maintain their own list of known peers; not all actors must
know and communicate will all peers on the network. As such, Table 4.5 also
indicates the peer list for each system actor, enumerating each peer a speciﬁc actor
could communicate with.
Table 4.5: Properties of the HARMS actors used in the third scenario
Machine

Platform

Peers list

Previously seen

micro

Windows PC

alice, bob, rasp, apple

Scenario 2

alice

Ubuntu (VM)

bob, micro

Scenario 1

bob

Ubuntu (VM)

alice, micro

Scenario 1

rasp

Raspberry Pi

micro, apple

Scenario 2

apple

Macbook Pro

micro, rasp

New

The previous two scenarios tested the potential vulnerabilities of unicast
messages. The third scenario, however, involved sending both multicast and
broadcast messages. Multicast messages are sent from one sender to multiple
speciﬁed peers in that actor’s peer list. Broadcast messages are sent to all peers in a
particular actor’s list. Each type of communication mechanism has potential
security implications, so the goal of this scenario was to have the adversary Mallory
attempt the previously-used network attacks on both multicast and broadcast
messages.
After sending messages in both multicast and broadcast modes, Mallory
discovered that these messages appear identical to unicast messages in terms of a
packet capture, but sent to multiple actors in quick succession. This meant that the
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man-in-the-middle attack via Ettercap worked in the same way; a ﬁlter was applied,
and the contents of the message were changed when they were detected in the
contents of the message. If the same message was sent to multiple actors, it was
changed similarly for each actor. The replay attack also worked identically to
previous scenarios as well. The adversary could arbitrarily send a properly-crafted
message to any HARMS actor, as long as that actor was aware of the peer listed in
the message as the sender.
Because multicast and broadcast messages were sent as multiple unicast
messages, the secure communication implementation was equally successful on these
modes of communication as it was in previous scenarios. Each pair of peers
negotiated session keys via DHKA, so the message was sent multiple times,
encrypted with the same pre-shared key each time but unique session keys per
recipient. This solution provided conﬁdentiality to prevent the active
man-in-the-middle attack from successfully changing message contents. For the
replay attack, one of two events could occur. If the message was captured for a
particular HARMS actor and sent to a diﬀerent one, the message was immediately
discarded as incorrect, because it was not decrypted with the appropriate session
key. If the message was a replay of something that actor was sent previously, it was
decrypted successfully but then marked as invalid, due to the expiration of the
timestamp. Table 4.6 summarizes the results of the third scenario.
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Table 4.6:

The summary of the two network attacks demonstrated on both

multicast and broadcast messages in the original HARMS system (harms) and the
implementation with secure communication (harms-secure) for the third scenario
No. of successful attacks

Man-in-the-middle attacks

Message type

harms

harms-secure

multicast

50 (100%)

0 (0%)

broadcast

50 (100%)

0 (0%)

100

100

multicast

50 (100%)

0* (0%)

broadcast

50 (100%)

0* (0%)

100

100

No. of total attempted attacks
Replay attacks

No. of total attempted attacks

4.4 Analysis
After testing the secure communication solution, the results indicate that it
was indeed successful in providing conﬁdentiality of message contents and
authentication of HARMS actors. Because conﬁdentiality could be maintained even
when an adversary captured network communication, the ﬁrst null hypothesis, H0,1 ,
was rejected. Other than application issues with the HARMS system preventing
communication from occurring, the results provide evidence to suggest that the
solution is robust against man-in-the-middle and replay network attacks without a
heavy burden placed on the user to conﬁgure complicated system properties.
Therefore, the second null hypothesis, H0,2 , is also rejected. Application issues or
extenuating circumstances with the network that cause HARMS communication to
fail would aﬀect both the original implementation as well as the secure version,
making these issues unrelated to the key exchange or encrypted communication
elements of the solution.
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Choosing both active man-in-the-middle attacks that altered the contents of
the messages on the ﬂy as well as a variant of the attack that allowed a
middleperson to capture and replay valid traﬃc turned out to provide two useful
real-world attacks for benchmarking purposes. In an environment modeled in
scenario one, where a machine periodically indicates system status via messages to
other HARMS actors, a man-in-the-middle attack was most appropriate. On the
other hand, when controlling a robot via remote-control commands, a replay attack
was most appropriate because the adversary can capture a single valid message and
control the robot arbitrary by continuously replaying it, rather than waiting for a
HARMS actor to again communicate with it. Both attacks were considered in all
three scenarios for comprehensiveness.
After the solution demonstrated resilience toward the replay attack due to
verifying system time, it became clear how important synchronized time was
between authorized HARMS actors. If two peers who use the pre-shared key
communicate (i.e., no malicious activity is actually occurring) but their system
clocks are oﬀ, the recipient will not validate the message that otherwise would have
been acceptable. However, because the threshold for validating a message with
timing diﬀerences is conﬁgurable, an administrator of a HARMS network can
change this amount of time for any number of valid reasons (e.g., large geographic
distance between actors who are communicating, or low computational resources to
perform the encryption and decryption functions).
In considering the system overhead introduced due to the cryptographic
functions implemented for the secure communication, a simple test was performed
to calculate how much longer a system needed to send a message securely. Using the
Raspberry Pi HARMS actor, the least powerful of the machines in terms of
computation, small modiﬁcations were added to the HARMS application to
determine how quickly a full DHKA process could take place and a unicast message
could be sent to a peer. Since this application is written in Java, the following code
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placed before and after the solution will provide an accurate view of the time
overhead:
ThreadMXBean threadBean = ManagementFactory.getThreadMXBean();
long time = threadBean.getCurrentThreadCpuTime();
In the worst case, where the Raspberry Pi system actor must negotiate
session keys as well as send a message to a peer, the entire process takes around 3
seconds. Although this is a long time, subsequent messages sent to the robot only
take 0.002 seconds on average to process. However, due to this time requirement
with the Raspberry Pi, the system-wide threshold for accepting messages is set to 4
seconds. With machines with signiﬁcantly more power, the timing overhead for
DHKA is not noticeable. If a HARMS network is composed of only these machines,
this threshold can be reduced signiﬁcantly.
Finally, after running the experiment for multicast and broadcast messages
(and during the implementation of the secure communication), it was discovered
that these messages are sent as multiple unicast messages. This indicates an avenue
for improvement in future research; this system can be written such that n messages
do not need to be sent to n actors via group key management or other
cryptographic methods outside the scope of this research.
The next chapter provides a summary of the research as a whole, oﬀers
conclusions, and expands upon potential future work.
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CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
This work was largely inspired by identifying a gap in secure communication
from previous work with the HARMS system. Because the HARMS model allows
for any number of heterogeneous entities to join together to achieve a common goal,
many distinct applications were identiﬁed early on, which included the adoption of
the HARMS system to the domain of ﬁreﬁghting robots. Due to the critical and
sometimes life-threatening nature of ﬁreﬁghting, implementing a solution for secure
communication was a prime focus, as no known solutions for a HARMS-model
network were present. During the literature review, it became apparent that
cyberphysical attacks on critical infrastructure are on the rise, further increasing
demand for the addition of security in communications.
Man-in-the-middle attacks were chosen as the scope for this project due to
their widespread use, relatively ease of execution, and eﬀective results when
performed accordingly. Three scenarios were chosen as the basis for the experiment
to provide both a variety in machines performing as HARMS actors and a variety of
communication methods. In all three scenarios, two forms of a middleperson attack
were demonstrated as a proof-of-concept on the original HARMS system: the active
man-in-the-middle attack that changed the contents of the messages in transit, and
the replay attack that captured messages and sent them to HARMS actors
arbitrarily and repeatedly.
After the attacks were demonstrated, the proposed solution was put in place.
This solution provided conﬁdentiality by implementing standard cryptographic
methods and key agreement protocols to negotiate ephemeral session keys. Message
authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation were also provided, making the
solution robust to many diﬀerent attacks. Pre-shared keys provided decentralized
authentication in this system by indicating knowledge only true system actors could
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have, a method of identity. Finally, a timestamp was added to the message so that
replay attacks against messages using even the most sophisticated encryption were
no longer possible. These secure communication mechanisms achieved forward
secrecy, so even if the pre-shared keys were compromised, no captured traﬃc could
be decrypted meaningfully.
The solution performed well in all tests, as man-in-the-middle attacks and
replay attacks were no longer possible against the new system in all three scenarios.
Certain concessions had to made, including installing pre-shared keys on all
HARMS machines, adding overhead during the key agreement protocol due to some
expensive cryptographic operations, and requiring synchronized system clocks for
message veriﬁcation.

5.1 Future Work
Future research could focus on several diﬀerent paths. First, there are other
types of network attacks to consider, such as denial of service attacks. These
attacks, which could include wireless traﬃc jamming, exploitation of the application
itself to tax the system or crash it all together, or tampering with the pre-shared
keys to prevent communication from succeeding.
The eﬃciency of the cryptosystem implemented in this research could also be
improved so that devices with low computing power can still communicate
eﬀectively as HARMS actors. This might include porting the HARMS system into a
lower level programming language, such as C.
Although timestamps were introduced as a security mechanism to help
prevent replay attacks, other types of checks could also be implemented to further
increase security of communication. Global positioning could be used to provide
geographic or localization data in the message, to better help prevent a situation
similar to the MiG-in-the-middle attack, where actors are very far away from each
other in space.
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As mentioned in Section 4.4, the implementation of multicast and broadcast
messages also has room for improvement. This problem introduces the concept of
shared secrets or some form of group key management, a new cryptographic hurdle
to overcome. However, if solved, this could lead to improvements in overall
performance and cut down on total network traﬃc.
Finally, applying this research to a real-world scenario that requires
ﬁreﬁghting robots would be of particular interest, now that this proof-of-concept has
been put in place.
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NOTES
Please note that parts of this thesis were included in a publication currently
in review to the 12th International Conference on Mobile Systems and Pervasive
Computing (MobiSPC 2015).

